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The Implications of Corporate
Political Donations
By Benjamin Edwards
orporate political
donations now raise
a mix of ethical,
legal, and business
issues. Donations serve to align
political candidates with corporate interests yet also entangle
corporations in political affairs.
At times, these donations sit
in tension with stated corporate values and commitments.
For example, how should we
respond to corporations that
publicly profess support for a
woman's right to access abortion
services while cutting checks to
politicians and political groups
actively working to ban access
to abortion services?
Direct corporate political
involvement remains a relatively new phenomenon. Until the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission
(2010), corporate money largely sat on
the sidelines during political campaigns.
Of course, political action committees
(PACs) existed, and corporate employees
and shareholders could voluntarily contribute to these committees. But corporations themselves were not free to directly
expend corporate funds to support political
campaigns. Citizens United changed this
dynamic. Corporations were suddenly able
to expend corporate funds and also found
themselves facing donation requests from
lawmakers.
As Dorthy S. Lund and Leo E. Strine
have explained, corporate political donations face a significant legitimacy problem.
A public corporation's shareholders generally lack any real influence over corporate
political spending. Corporate law grants
corporate managers the power to allocate
corporate assets. Shareholders do not vote
on a corporation's day-to-day affairs. The
law grants shareholders opportunities to
vote on certain major transactions and
director elections. When a corporation
decides to support a particular political

22

K nr

aKrights

candidate or party, it may do so even though
most of its shareholders find the action
morally repugnant. As it stands, no evidence
indicates that investors now pick stocks
to support certain political candidates.
Many of these corporate political
contributions occur in the dark. Much
corporate political spending may never be
disclosed to shareholders, employees, or
the public. This means that shareholders
may lack any meaningful way to evaluate
whether to sell their stock to avoid indirectly supporting candidates with views diametrically opposed to their own. Employees may continue working at a corporation
without knowing that it donates to candidates who demonize people just like them.
The system often leaves voters in the dark
as well. Obscured corporation donations
make it impossible for ordinary voters to
tell where the money behind a candidate's
ads came from. And when corporations
do voluntarily disclose information about
political donations, they ordinarily do so in
a manner designed to cater to investor, not
voter, interests. This means that disclosures
about political contributions may arrive
alongside an annual financial report, well
after an election has occurred. This timing

problem makes it impossible
for the voting public to take the
donation into account.
New reform efforts aim to
make it easier for investors to
understand a public company's
performance along environmental, social, and governance
(ESG) metrics. The surging ESG
movement has support from
major institutional investors
seeking data about corporate
activities. How much and exactly
what a public company should
be forced to disclose remain a
heated debate. Some investors
contend that corporations should
be forced to disclose their donations so that investors may take
the donations into account when
making investment decisions. A
corporation making donations inconsistent with its stated policies and commitments may be a bad bet. Some critics
see proposed disclosure requirements as
potentially deterring corporations from
making donations. As corporate donations
tilt toward conservative candidates, some
see these reforms as serving political rather
than investor ends. By increasing the risk
of backlash, disclosure requirements may
slow the river of corporate cash flowing
into conservative campaign coffers.
Adding to the oversight difficulty
for investors, most Americans indirectly
invest in public corporations through
mutual funds, index funds, and other
pooled investment vehicles. A retirement
saver with an index fund may indirectly
invest in hundreds of public companies,
potentially becoming connected to a massive web of corporate political donations.
Even if corporations were forced to disclose their political spending, ordinary
investors would still struggle to align
their portfolios with their values.
Yet, should disclosures serve only public
company investors? Professor Ann Lipton
has argued that disclosure requirements
should serve more than just investor audi-

ences because of the role large public and
private corporations play in our society.
Society's right to know much basic information about large business entities now
turns on whether the business raises capital
through public or private markets.
Ultimately, the current system does
little to meaningfully ensure that corporate political donations truly align with
a corporation's interest. Corporate law
generally protects managers' discretion
to exercise their business judgment about
how to expend corporate assets. Thus,
corporate managers will likely never be
second-guessed when they donate the
corporation's funds in their view of the
corporation's interest. Of course, there is
always the risk that corporate managers
may conflate their personal preferences
with the corporation's and allocate political
donations in line with their political views
and not the corporation's true interest. As
corporate leaders skew significantly more
conservatively than the public, there is
good reason to fear that corporate leaders
direct corporate assets to conservative
politicians even at the expense of the
corporation's interests.
Making corporate political donations
seemingly requires complex calculation.
Flesh-and-blood political candidates will
imperfectly align with the corporation's
stated policy views, values, and long-term
commitments. Consider the dilemma
faced by a corporate manager weighing
whether to allocate corporate assets to
support a conservative state legislator. The
legislator may favor lighter regulation on
the corporation's activities in the jurisdiction but also favor laws making it difficult
for transgender individuals to access public
bathrooms or for public schools to provide
basic education about gender identity and
sexual orientation. To the extent that the
corporation has lesbian, gay, bisexual, or
transgender stakeholders and a professed
commitment to equality, making the donation invites a host of other risks. Even if
the donation goes undiscovered, supporting the conservative legislator likely increases the difficulty the corporation will
face in recruiting and retaining talented
employees to work in the jurisdiction. If
later revealed, the donation invites public
backlash and boycotts.
Many corporations have faced public
retribution for political contributions
seemingly at odds with their stated values

and brands. The private Anschutz Corporation recently attracted attention for its
sizable donation to the Republican Attorney General Association. The association
previously attracted national attention
for funding former President Donald
Trump's rally on January 6, 2021, as well
as making mass phone calls in advance of
it telling people to "march to the Capitol
and tell Congress to stop the steal." Despite this history, the Anschutz Corporation donated $75,000 to the association
days after the Supreme Court overturned
Roe v. Wade on June 24, 2022, and directly
after the association disseminated fundraising emails asking for funds to "combat
the Democrats' pro-abortion agenda." The
Anschutz Corporation operates many businesses, including Coachella and other live
music events. Coachella's success depends
on its access to prominent artists-many
of whom have signaled strong support for
ensuring access to abortion services. In
response to public outcry, the Anschutz
Corporation issued a statement that its
principal shareholder personally supports
a woman's right to choose.
At the same time, corporations have
faced legislative retaliation for remaining
consistent and advocating for their stated
commitments. Responding to pressure from
stakeholders, the Walt Disney Company
opposed legislative efforts in Florida to
prohibit education about sexual orientation and gender identity in public schools.
In response, Florida's governor led an
effort to strip existing state law benefits
from Disney.
Given these challenges and risks, many
stakeholders might prefer to flatly prohibit
corporations from making these donations
instead of trusting corporate managers to
set aside their own interests and act in the
true interests of the corporation.
Yet, what are the interests of a corporation? If you listen to the corporate
executives at the Business Roundtable,
they believe that a corporation's purpose
extends beyond merely making money to
doing more for communities. This new
corporate rhetoric stresses the need to
"foster diversity and inclusion, dignity
and respect." It includes, among other
things, protecting "the environment by
embracing sustainable practices across
our businesses." Whether the Business
Roundtable statement serves as a meaningful commitment or a hollow market-

ing ploy designed to fend off real reform
remains to be seen. How will its signatories defend their donations to politicians
who deny the reality of climate change or
who oppose reduced emissions targets?
This view from corporate leaders may
be difficult to reconcile with Delaware
law, which holds that the purpose of a
corporation is simply to make a profit.
Some take the view that sustainability
and profit-seeking go hand in hand, as
corporate leaders look to make sustainable
profits over a long time horizon. Thus,
donations to politicians advocating for
stricter environmental regulation might
also be justified as being in the corporation's long-term interest. By protecting
managerial judgment to allocate corporate
funds in line with corporate managers'
business judgment about a corporation's
interest, nearly any donation may be
justified.
Of course, not all states approach the
issue as Delaware does. Many, such as
Nevada, have passed constituency statutes
allowing corporate leaders to consider the
interests of stakeholders in making decisions. These states grant corporate leaders
even more freedom instead of forcing them
to somehow justify actions with some link
to a profit-seeking purpose.
Corporate leaders will continue to
face increasing pressure to take a stand
on issues important to their stakeholders.
This may include shareholders, employees,
customers, or other business partners. As
Professor Tom Lin details in his book The
Capitalistand the Activist, these forces will
continue to grow. It may not be possible to
impose neat lines between economic and
political life.
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